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AMERICA’S RAILROAD DEPRECIATION 
DEBATE, 1907 TO 1913: A STUDY OF 
DIVERGENCE IN EARLY 20th CENTURY 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
Abstract: In June 1907, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
released new reporting rules that would require railroads to change 
from betterment to depreciation accounting for equipment. The new 
rules set off a firestorm of protest because the railroads felt they were 
already recognizing physical depreciation through the current system. 
The ICC, however, was looking at the concept of economic deprecia-
tion to match the cost of equipment with revenue over the life of the 
asset in much the same way that industry was beginning to account 
for its fixed assets. Such economic depreciation, it was felt, would 
give the rate-setting ICC more stable reported incomes to determine 
return on assets and the investing public a better feel for the results of 
railroad operations. The debate began in a cordial fashion but deteri-
orated into bitter name-calling, civil disobedience, and litigation that 
challenged both the accounting rules and the authority of the ICC to 
issue and require them. The ICC partially won the debate, yet rail-
roads were able to keep betterment accounting for track structures 
another 70 years before the full convergence of industry and railroad 
accounting standards occurred.
 
INTRODUCTION 
 After nearly 20 years of ineffective railroad regulation by 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the U.S. Congress 
in 1906 passed the Hepburn Amendment to clarify several Su-
preme Court decisions and to force the railroad industry to pub-
lish its rate schedules. The new act also gave the ICC legal au-
thority to set “fair and reasonable” rail tariffs and rates. The law 
authorized the ICC to develop uniform accounting procedures 
for railroads to meet this new mandate. The ICC quickly issued 
new accounting and financial reporting rules for all railroads 
that came under its jurisdiction. Though the rules were similar 
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank the former editor Stephen Walker, 
two anonymous reviewers, the current editor Richard Fleischman, and Melinda 
Hyche for her meticulous editing of the final draft.
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to the ones issued in 1894 and largely ignored by the industry, 
the railroads were now required to recognize a depreciation ex-
pense and a corresponding reserve for their “non-permanent” 
fixed assets – rail equipment. Protests quickly erupted over the 
new rules and a fiery debate ensued between the railroad’s tra-
ditional concept of “physical depreciation” and the ICC’s appli-
cation of a new theory called “economic depreciation.” Though 
the debate solidified the ICC’s authority to issue and require spe-
cific accounting rules, it eventually compromised and allowed 
betterment accounting for track and way structures, a compro-
mise that would result in divergent accounting standards be-
tween railroads and industry for the next 70 years.
 This paper tracks the debate over these depreciation issues 
from their inception in 1907 to the final disposition by the Su-
preme Court in 1913. The debate is well documented through 
the records of the ICC and related articles published in the na-
tional press like the Wall Street Journal (the Journal), the New 
York Times (the Times), and the railroad industry’s own publi-
cation, the Railway Age Gazette (the Gazette).1 Prominent pub-
lic accountants also weighed into the debate on both sides of 
the issue, indicating an unsettled debate within the profession 
over the course of the modernization of accounting principles 
in the U.S. in the early 20th century. Though each source has 
its own biases, taken together, they give a sense of the passion 
on both sides of America’s great railroad depreciation debate. 
BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE
 In 1902, the newly constituted U.S. Steel Company de-
veloped innovative financial reporting procedures that includ-
ed recognition of depreciation charges on fixed assets. Though 
the concept of physical depreciation of fixed assets had been 
recognized for nearly three quarters of a century, according to 
Younkins and Flesher [1984, p. 257], the U.S. Steel disclosures 
were unique among contemporary firms because they reported 
depreciation as a separate expense on the income statement. 
Such an innovation helped to institutionalize the concept of 
economic depreciation and paved the way for the modern ac-
crual accounting standards currently in use a century later. Be-
cause of its mission to control rail rates through the analysis of 
accounting and other operational data, such an innovation in 
1First published in 1856, the Railroad Gazette absorbed a smaller competi-
tor called the Railway Age and changed its name to Railway Age in January 1908, 
with a further name change in July 1908 to the Railway Age Gazette. 
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 accounting could hardly have missed the attention of the coun-
try’s primary railroad regulatory agency, the ICC, and its long-
time chief statistician, Professor Henry Carter Adams.
The Desire for a Uniform Railroad Accounting Policy2: Since the 
inception of the ICC in 1887, Henry Adams had attempted to 
standardize railroad reporting in the U.S., using Section 20 of 
the Interstate Commerce Act3 as his authority. The section read, 
in part, “the Commission may . . . the purposes of the act, pre-
scribe a period of time within which all common carriers sub-
ject to the provisions of this Act shall have, a uniform system 
of  accounts and the manner in which such accounts should be 
kept.”
 His first attempt to create uniform accounting rules was in 
1894, when the ICC issued Classifications of Operating Expens-
es to guide railroads in their data-reporting requirements. The 
requirements included modern double-entry accounting practic-
es; however, its modified accrual nature left a limited articula-
tion between the balance sheet and income statement (actually 
a profit and loss account). Though the American Association of 
Railroad Accounting Officers (AARAO) was instrumental in de-
veloping the pamphlet, the reporting requirements went largely 
ignored by other regulators and the industry. First, the ICC-insti-
tuted National Association of Railroad Commissioners (NARC) 
balked at their usage because state commissioners felt that the 
new accounting rules would hinder their ability to control rail 
rates within their respective jurisdictions. This process led to 
multiple and conflicting accounting procedures across state ju-
risdictions that caused confusion among the railroads, leading 
them to resist the new national standards. Finally, legal rulings 
and legislative inaction stymied Adams’ goal of a uniform ac-
counting system for all railroads. Though Adams and the ICC 
knew that the nation’s railroad reporting practices needed mod-
ernization, they could take no action until Congress gave the 
ICC further authority.
 In the meantime, Adams continued to issue minor revi-
sions and clarifications to the ill-fated Classifications of Operat-
ing Expenses to make the reporting process more understand-
able. The nature of the accounting, however, changed very little 
2For a review of the development of ICC reporting requirements before 1900, 
see Heier [1994, pp. 101-110].
3Act to Regulate Interstate Commerce, February 4, 1887, amended June 29, 
1906, 34 Stat. 584.
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from the 1894 document. The NARC [1905, p. 30] augured a 
change when discussing the ICC’s clarification in the definition 
of additions, betterments, and improvements for the AARAO. 
The clarification read: “Operating Expenses should include all 
expenditures necessary to keep up the general standard of effi-
ciency.” The meaning was clear; the expenses currently report-
ed by the railroads regarding fixed asset usage were not suffi-
cient to give a clear picture of rail operations. The railroads, 
however, were probably not too concerned with such a course 
change because the ICC’s position (both politically and legally) 
had not changed, at least not yet. 
The Hepburn Amendment: On June 6, 1906, Congress finally act-
ed and passed the Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate Com-
merce Act. The new act also gave the ICC the legal authority 
to set fair and reasonable rail tariffs. To meet this new man-
date, regulators were authorized to “develop uniform account-
ing rules, and to prescribe the forms of all accounts, records 
and memoranda to be kept by carriers” [ICC, 1907b, p.139]. The 
law now empowered the ICC to have rate setting as its prima-
ry mission. A uniform accounting system for railroads became 
Adams’ focus. As one would imagine, the railroad industry was 
not elated over the new legislation as evidenced by an editori-
al published in the Gazette [January 11, 1907, p. 32]. In a mut-
ed and measured tone, the industry expressed the opinion that, 
“The new rate law gives the Interstate Commerce Commission 
the fullest authority over railroad statistics and accounts, with 
the power, not only to prescribe what accounts shall be kept, 
but to forbid keeping an unapproved statistic.” 
 The rail industry had resigned itself to the fact that the ICC 
had substantially more power, but it also suggested in the arti-
cle that slow and deliberate change in reporting requirements 
would better serve the traveling public and shippers. Though 
protests would soon erupt over required depreciation charg-
es, the rail industry at this point was more concerned with the 
ICC’s potential inclusion of “out-side” or non-rail income as part 
of tariff rate calculations. Such an inclusion would disrupt the 
sensitive rate-of-return formulas that the ICC would be using to 
set passenger and freight rates. Regardless of what the chang-
es were going to be, it was clear that the industry was going 
to face new accounting rules soon.
 During the transition from the amendment’s ratification 
and the issuance of new uniform accounting standards, the ICC 
again enlisted the help of the AARAO. Professor Adams acted 
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as the ICC’s liaison to a newly created Committee of Twenty-
Five. The ICC’s annual report [1907b, p. 40] indicated: “Con-
ferences [with the AARAO] developed interesting and instruc-
tive differences of opinion on many accounting questions. But 
it may be said that, with a few exceptions, the results arrived 
at were in harmony with a consensus of opinion of a majori-
ty of its members.” The annual report did not disclose the na-
ture of the discussions, but changes in accounting procedures 
at the large manufacturers, like U.S. Steel, must have been on 
the minds of the conferees. Depreciation could well have been 
at the top of this list in light of comments from Price Water-
house’s George O. May [1962, p. 190] who indicated in his mem-
oirs that “in 1906 the straight-line amortization concept of de-
preciation was in fairly general use in the industrial field.” 
 The ICC planned to issue new financial reporting rules 
for all railroads that came under its jurisdiction by June 1907. 
Though the prospective rules were very similar to the ones is-
sued in 1894, the new system would include more accruals that 
would increase balance sheet and income statement articulation 
similar to modern financial statements. To foster the moderni-
zation of railroad reporting, the ICC also focused on the fixed 
asset and capital accounts. Like U.S. Steel, the railroads would 
probably now, in all likelihood, be required to recognize depre-
ciation expense instead of their traditional manner of account-
ing for fixed assets called betterment accounting. Succinctly put, 
depreciation represented the systematic expensing of fixed as-
set costs in contrast to the periodic (or irregular) recognition 
of expense under betterment accounting.
A Short Explanation of Betterment Accounting: An early discus-
sion of fixed asset accounting and profitability for railroads 
came in the 1870s from Albert Fink, the superintendent of the 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Fink suggested in an adden-
dum to the 1875 L&N annual report [Fink, 1875, pp. 6-7] that 
renewal accounts that compared actual repair costs with es-
timated repair costs to determine annual “due to that year’s 
operations” … [and] … “To make the annual reports of a railroad 
company of value, the accounts of the company should be so 
kept as to show the expenses.” Fink’s methodology would be re-
fined and institutionalized over the next thirty years, and came 
to be known simply as “betterment accounting.” The name of 
the methodology would evolve into the more theoretically de-
scriptive retirement-replacement-betterment (RRB) accounting, 
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) [1983, 
5
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Para. 5], at the time of RRB discontinuance in 1983, defined 
this practice as follows:
Under RRB, the initial costs of installing track are cap-
italized, not depreciated, and remain capitalized until 
the track is retired. The costs of replacing track are ex-
pensed unless a betterment (for example, replacing a 
110-lb. rail with a 132-lb. rail) occurs. In that case, the 
amount by which the cost of the new part exceeds the 
current cost of the part replaced is considered a bet-
terment and is capitalized but not depreciated, and the 
current cost of the part replaced is expensed. Railroads 
generally have used RRB for financial reporting.
 Unlike the use of modern depreciation accounting, which 
actually matched fixed asset cost to revenues over a given pe-
riod, the railroad under betterment accounting did not recoup 
the cost of the track until replaced. It could happen in some 
years that no charges to current operating expenses from track 
usage were matched against revenue if no track was replaced. 
 By 1907, the methodology described above had been in 
widespread use and acted as the basis for reporting the account 
balances of the railroad’s two primary fixed asset accounts, 
equipment and track structures. As the depreciation debate de-
veloped, the ICC would take the position that betterment ac-
counting did not reflect the true cost of a railroad’s operations 
because in lean years it would simply not do any replacements 
or upgrades, a major safety concern for the ICC. The ICC hoped 
that the upcoming depreciation requirements would provide a 
more “accurate” rendering of these fixed asset balances through 
a more systematic matching of fixed expenses with revenue. As 
the ICC moved towards the rate-of-return basis for evaluating 
rail rates, it would become clear to the rail industry that de-
preciation was at the heart of the evolution of the concept of 
“reasonable rates” and “reasonable returns” as articulated by 
the 1898 Smyth vs. Ames [169 U.S. 466] decision.
 Exhibit 1 below shows a hypothetical comparison of rail re-
turns due to the impact of the new 1907 depreciation charges 
on a railroad’s financial results compared with betterment ac-
counting. With betterment accounting intact, the pre-1907 in-
come levels per train mile were lower due to an artificially high 
expense ratio. This helped the railroads to either maintain a 
lower return ratio and, consequently, higher tariff rates or jus-
tify their request for an increase. It was also possible for the 
railroads to schedule betterment expenditures to plan or smooth 
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annual income levels.4 This expense timing was the central prob-
lem voiced by the ICC in its 1905 annual report. On the other 
hand, with the partial accounting for depreciation charges on 
equipment, the financial position of the railroad may be im-
proved, leading regulators to construe the higher income levels 
as unreasonable. The railroad could then expect a revision of the 
rail rates downward to compensate for the “excess income.”
EXHIBIT 1
Estimated Change in Railroad Financial Accounting 
Results
Accounting  
before 1907
Accounting  
After 1907
Rail Structure Costs $2,500,000 $2,500,000
Depreciable Equipment Costs $2,500,000 $2,500,000
Total Assets $3,000,000 $3,000,000
Revenues $1,000,000 $1,000,000
Operating Expenses $2,400,000 $2,400,000
Rail Structure Betterments $2,200,000 $2,200,000
Equipment Betterments $2,150,000
Depreciation Assume 7.00% X $500,000 $2,235,000
Total Expenses $2,750,000 $2,635,000
Net Income $2,250,000 $2,365,000
Train-Miles 10,000,000
Revenue Per Mile $1210.1000 $1210.1000
Costs Per Mile $1210.0750 $1210.0635
Income per mile $1210.0250 $1210.0365
Return on Assets = Income ÷ Assets 8.33% 12.16%
THE ICC ISSUES NEW REPORTING RULES
The Preliminary Debate over the New Depreciation Rules: With 
little fanfare and with even less guidance, the ICC [1907a], on 
June 3, 1907, released new accounting rules as an update to 
the ICC’s original document, Classifications of Operating Ex-
penses.5 The first look at the new rules had actually occurred 
in April 1907 when the ICC issued Circular No. 5 to detail the 
4For the effects of the ICC accounting changes on income smoothing, see Si-
vakumar and Waymire [2003].
5The newly required equipment depreciation was highlighted essentially 
through the reorganization and renumbering of an official account classification 
scheme.
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proposed accounting changes and to give the industry due proc-
ess to comment on them before final publication. The Journal 
[May 21, 1907, p. 3] reported that a large number of railroads 
had indeed commented on the new rules, especially with regard 
to depreciation accounting. The written replies to the circular 
expressed a wide range of views on the formal depreciation ac-
count. According to the article, comments regarding Circular 
No. 5 framed the coming issue by saying, “it may be said that 
current practice [betterment accounting] allows for depreciation 
by including renewals or replacements in operating expense and 
consequently railways do not need a formal depreciation ac-
count.” The article continued by making the editorial comment 
that, “It is at least our opinion [that the ICC] question wheth-
er or not this is an appropriate method of procedure.” It was 
reported that the railroads felt that “there seems to be no dis-
agreement on the proposition that operating expense should be 
charged with the full amount of wear incident to the use of the 
property, and that any excess over that amount should be sepa-
rately charged to income.” These types of comments again sig-
naled the railroad’s coming stance that depreciation was phys-
ical in nature and not economic, and reinforced the railroads’ 
fear that any depreciation account would degrade the balance 
of the asset accounts and upset the delicate balance of the re-
turn-on-asset ratios.6
 Even with the preliminary ICC circulars issued in April and 
May, it still appears that the railroads may have been caught 
off-guard by some of the new depreciation rules, as evidenced 
by the silence in the Gazette before June on the process lead-
ing up to the promulgation of the new accounting rules. In 
fact, an early article in the Gazette [April 19, 1907, p. 507] con-
tained no discussion of depreciation but instead stressed an up-
coming rule that would make the railroad’s head accountant a 
sworn agent of the government and the issue of non-rail relat-
ed income being used in the rate-of-return formulas. In an ar-
ticle published after the issuance of the rules, the Gazette [June 
21, 1907, pp. 883-884] indicated that the present rules only ap-
plied to equipment but that there was a possibility of the appli-
cation of depreciation rules to track and structures. The article 
further explained that such a move would make the account-
ing for track additions or repairs less flexible than the current 
6It appears that companion circulars were also issued during 1907 for the 
more contentious issue of classification of “additions and betterments” related to 
those costs of upgrading permanent fixed assets such as structures and rail beds. 
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American system that allowed for management decisions relat-
ed to the recognition of no capital costs in bad years, a safety 
concern to be sure.
 According to Barret [1907, p. 486], a competing publica-
tion, Railroad World, did express tacit support for the new ac-
counting rules when it wrote, “Hitherto this question has been 
thrust aside with scanty apology that due attention to repairs, 
renewals and replacements excuses the omission. At its worst, 
the omission to make allowance for depreciation leads to un-
earned payments to capital, to eventual overcapitalization, and 
finally to bankruptcy.” Railroad World then expressed concern 
that any rate-of-return calculations from the ICC must take into 
account depreciation charges or there would be a reduction in 
asset values. Although this industry publication was moderate-
ly positive about the change to depreciation, it seemed to sug-
gest that the ICC had ulterior safety motives for the change.
 Even before the official release of the new accounting rules, 
Adams and members of the ICC readied the markets, the pub-
lic, and especially the railroads for the announcement. For ex-
ample, the Journal [May 21, 1907, p. 3] reported on the pro-
spective accounting changes, indicating that they “were to be set 
up providing for the replacement of property – annual percent-
ages to be left to the carriers.” The same article reported that 
the ICC’s aim for the new system of accounts was to “simpli-
fy the now complex problem of determining what a railroad is 
earning.” Adams was quoted in an interview as saying, “it was 
the intention of the commission to draw a clear line between 
charges [that] merely made good the actual wear and due tear 
or represented depreciations and such as represented by better-
ments and additions whether the latter is chargeable directly to 
income or to capital.” Here the argument went beyond the rec-
ognition of depreciation, and moved towards a more modern 
differentiation between capital improvements that would be de-
preciated and operating expenses that would have a direct ef-
fect on the earnings of a railroad.
 Adams went on to indicate that in the present railroad ac-
counting system, the definitions of such items as repairs, bet-
terments, and additions did not convey a definite meaning, 
“hence the necessity of establishing principles of accounting as 
will enable the commission to determine whether operating ex-
penses as charged on the company’s books properly represent 
the cost of transportation.” In the eyes of the ICC, the railroads 
were now charging only “capital improvements” against current 
income, which masked the true earnings of the corporation 
9
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 because under betterment accounting there was never a recov-
ery of the original cost of the railroad’s equipment through the 
income statement until replacement. Adams further explained 
the depreciation provision would better allow for the replace-
ment of property before wear and tear finally forces the issue. 
Unfortunately, at this point in the interview Adams made a mod-
ern theoretical mistake by saying: “Provisions should be made 
out of earnings of property during the period of its use to re-
place it.…The purpose of depreciation is to provide a replace-
ment fund.” 
 Though it was clear that Adams was moving toward the ap-
plication of economic depreciation and away from accounting 
for the physical depreciation of the railroad equipment, he did 
seem to harbor the perspective that depreciation, though non-
cash in nature, would provide a direct funding source for the 
replacement of equipment. Such an idea may have come from 
contemporary manufacturers like U.S. Steel, which reported 
equipment depreciation with extinguishments of debt. For ex-
ample, in the 1904 U.S. Steel annual report [p. 11], the com-
pany stated: “The appropriation of these funds has been made 
with the idea that, thus aided, the Bond Sinking Funds will liq-
uidate the capital investment in the properties at the expiration 
of their life.” In addition, the report also mentioned: “These 
funds are used to improve, modernize, and strengthen proper-
ties.” In the short term, Adams’ early misunderstanding of the 
cash nature of depreciation would cause some confusion in the 
application of the new rules and overshadow the ICC’s purpose 
better to match railroad expenditures with revenue. Finally, the 
article also reported that the railroads did not object to the idea 
of taking expenditures in excess of wear and tear out of earn-
ings, but they were leery that investors would construe a for-
mal depreciation fund as cash available for dividends.
 The rationale for the new ICC accounting rules may have 
gone beyond a more uniform accounting system and may have 
focused on two other motivations. The first of these may have 
been to foster safer railroad operations by actually forcing the 
continued replacement of railroad equipment on a scheduled 
basis through a change in accounting procedures. A more per-
nicious consideration may have been the ICC’s desire eventually 
to standardize rail tariffs through railroad valuation. This possi-
bility was made evident in a Journal article [May 23, 1907, p.1] 
that reported a speech by ICC Commissioner, Charles A. Pouty, 
before the National Association of Manufacturers in which he 
discussed the ICC’s reasons for changing the regulatory rules. 
10
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 First, Pouty indicated that government itself was on trial, 
and that regulation must be “sufficiently strong to choke the cry 
for national operation.” The concept of federal ownership and 
operation of the railroads had become popular as anti-capitalist 
views began to spread in the U.S. in the early part of the 19th 
century. Though he did not like the idea of government con-
trol and felt the private sector the better place to control rail 
operations, he did feel that a cabinet-level department of rail-
roads should be set up to oversee rail operations and set na-
tional transportation policy.7 Pouty also explained that the gov-
ernment, and not private individuals, should have over-sight 
responsibility in rate setting. This appears to have been a crit-
icism of the federal courts and their intervention in ICC deci-
sions on behalf of private litigants. Most importantly for this 
story, Pouty indicated that, “it is probable that the interstate rail-
ways should be valued by the national government.” Pouty, the 
ICC, and the rail industry knew that valuation needed proper 
(and uniform) accounting data. The news report quoted Pouty 
as saying: “The popular impression that if the value of our rail-
roads were known it would be easy to adjust rates that a fair 
return upon that value and only a fair return would be obtained 
is entirely erroneous. The cost of reproduction is but a sin-
gle factor which enters just value.” Although Pouty never men-
tioned the subject of the new depreciation rules, he did focus 
on a set of criticisms regarding the methods railroads used to 
determine and account for the value of their long-term capital. 
According to Pouty, railroads could easily hide investments in 
the form of stocks and bonds in related and sometimes com-
peting railroads.8
 In a related Journal article [May 22, 1907, p. 5], Adams 
echoed Pouty’s comments when he said: “The valuation of rail-
roads on a scientific basis is quite feasible, but the reasonable-
ness of railroad rates is and must be a matter of human judg-
ment exercised beyond the bounds of mere valuation.” Adams 
went on to explain that the individual subjects of railroad cap-
italization, valuation, and rates are related by giving a convo-
luted example where income should not be above the amount 
needed to maintain operations if it is to be deemed reasonable 
7It would be nearly 60 years later when the Department of Transportation 
was established by an act of Congress on October 15, 1966, with its first official 
day of operations on April 1, 1967.
8This was a direct reference to the stock manipulation case where E.H. Har-
riman of the Union Pacific and Rock Island Railroads secretly bought a directly 
competing line called the Alton Railroad. 
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income by the Commission. In a more modern sense, he then 
differentiated between the valuation used to set rates and that 
of the market valuation of the railroad securities themselves. 
Market valuation he felt did not equate to regulatory valuation 
when it came to setting freight and passenger rates.
 The popular view in this era was that high railroad mar-
ket valuations were the result of high and unfair rail tariffs. 
Through his example, it appears that Adams saw this contro-
versy differently. He felt that the high market valuations and 
high rates were only tangentially related by the fact that the 
most profitable railroads also seemed to have the highest mar-
ket value. In the end, Adams and the ICC would continue to 
focus on the return on assets to determine the reasonableness 
of tariffs in keeping with legal rulings. Finally, like Pouty, Ad-
ams was laying the groundwork for acceptance of the upcom-
ing accounting rule changes. It was clear that physical valua-
tion of the railroads was on the ICC’s agenda, and that the ICC 
was going to gather the necessary data on the railroad’s capital 
assets needed to complete this task.9 When asked about prog-
ress towards completing the new accounting system, Adams 
said: “They have progressed much further than I thought they 
would by this time. Operating revenues and operating expense 
accounts are practically done and the accountants are pulling 
together and mean business.”
 After the official release of the new rules the next week, 
an article published in the Journal [June 7, 1907, p. 6] high-
lighted the major accounting changes promulgated by the ICC. 
In general, the required revenue and expense items mirrored 
those of the 1894 requirements; however, the railroads were 
now supposed to report those financial results monthly to the 
ICC, presumably so that the ICC could maintain control over 
both short-term and long-term tariffs. According to the article, 
the major change in accounting regulations for 1907 included 
the requirement for a formal provision of depreciation charges 
and reserves for all companies covered by the Interstate Com-
merce Act. This depreciation requirement also differentiated op-
erating expenses and capital improvements by indicating, “The 
purpose of these depreciation charges is to have the exact cost 
9As a side note, in a compromise to get the Hepburn Amendment passed, the 
explicit ability of the ICC to value railroad assets directly was not given; howev-
er, it was not expressly forbidden either, a point of contention for years. For a re-
view of the political environment surrounding the development of the ICC and 
the 1906 Hepburn Amendment, see Miranti [1989].
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of a particular month or a particular year, and thus enable a 
correct statement of net revenue from operations.” The article 
then explained that the new definitions of betterments and ad-
ditions will also result in keeping the cost improvements out of 
current operating expenses.
 The lack of depreciation of track and way structures had 
been noted just a week before in the Journal [May 29, 1907, 
p. 6], anticipating the new accounting rules. The article quoted 
an ICC official who said, “operating expenses must not be bur-
dened with expenditures for additional equipment, tracks, bal-
last, or additions to the railroad, the purposes of which are to 
improve the property operated.” In addition, the official further 
divulged: “The chief new feature of these primary accounts is 
that a depreciation account, set aside for renewal accounts, has 
been supplied for every item of equipment. [However] there is 
no depreciation account for way and structures.” The article 
then quoted Adams as saying, “it is impossible to arrive at any 
final conclusion as to how the rule of depreciation should be 
applied to roadbed and buildings, and that the subject will be 
specifically investigated during the coming fiscal year.” Adams’ 
trepidation over any change of betterment accounting rules for 
track and way structures would continue in ICC policy making 
for years to come due to the ICC’s indecision about just how 
to depreciate permanent structures given conflicting theories of 
wear and tear and cost matching. The issues would be a focus 
of railroad depreciation debates lasting into the early 1980s.
THE REACTION TO THE ACCOUNTING CHANGES
Reactions by Industry through the Railroad Press: As expected, 
protests over the new accounting rules were almost immedi-
ate but surprisingly cordial. One of the first was an innocuous 
attempt by L.F. Loree, president of the Delaware and Hudson 
RR, to circulate a petition asking the ICC to postpone the im-
plementation of the accounting rules for one year. He made the 
request, “on the grounds that it will make it impossible for rail-
roads to make comparisons in the results of their operations 
for the previous year” [the Gazette, 1907, p. 869]. In an era of 
pen and ink accounting systems, a better request would have 
been for a delay in the implementation of the new rules due 
to the short period, approximately four weeks, given the rail-
roads to comply with the new regulations. For the ICC, they 
felt the transition, which was scheduled for the post-June 1907 
reporting period, actually gave the railroads one year to imple-
13
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ment the new accounting system before the June 1908 reports. 
Any delay at this point would have pushed its implementation 
back to 1909. 
 A Times article [June 15, 1907, p.12] provided a better pre-
view of the coming opposition from the railroad industry, re-
porting that, “efforts are being made by some large railroads 
to thwart some of the plans of the [ICC] in the matter of stand-
ardizing the accounts of all railroads, and for the establishment 
of such form of accounts as will set forth clearly all financial 
operations.” Rail industry leaders had supposedly gathered to 
discuss the matter and cooperate on a response. As an inter-
esting side note, both the newspaper and the industry must 
have misunderstood the new ICC regulations due to an errone-
ous impression that tracks and roadway were included in the 
depreciation order. In a surprising revelation, the article point-
ed out that the other railroad officials put the blame for the 
ICC’s new rules on the Pennsylvania Railroad’s decision to use 
depreciation accounting, an interesting comment considering 
the Pennsy’s later protests.The rail officials felt that Pennsy’s 
move gave the ICC the final impetus to modify its stance on 
the emerging depreciation issue. Finally, the rail industry also 
saw that the new rules were probably rooted in politics, with 
President Roosevelt pushing for the changes. The writer of the 
article, however, felt the new accounting rules, “set the true [fi-
nancial] position of railroads, and enable investors … to deter-
mine more easily just what each railroad is doing in the mat-
ter of maintaining property and the extent earnings are used 
to improve it.” The writer’s last argument may have again sig-
naled the ICC’s hidden safety agenda.
 In an attempt to define the industry’s objections to the new 
accounting rules, the Gazette began publishing a series of specif-
ic articles about the rules. In an article with the combative title 
“A Defective Accounting System” [the Gazette, June 21, 1907, pp. 
883-884], the industry put forth its early arguments against the 
new system. The three-page technical article (its tone though 
was that of an editorial) began with an explanation of the proc-
ess used to develop the new rules including the participation 
by the AARAO, an issue that would spilt railroad officials lat-
er. First, the article criticized the way the ICC used the account-
ant’s recommendations, which “serves to illustrate how easy it 
is for railroad regulation to go astray and make mistakes un-
less the persons doing the regulating possess the broadest kind 
of outlook of the entire situation.” Next, the industry saw the 
ICC as a threat due in part to its politicized nature and its lack 
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of direct experience in rail operations. Finally, the editorial ex-
plained that there were only two purposes for keeping accounts. 
The first purpose was to prevent unauthorized expenditures and 
the second was to control operations. Essentially, the industry 
felt that the new rules applied quite well to the first, but failed 
in their attempt to meet the second purpose for four primary 
reasons. 
 First, the railroads rejected the new system based on the 
structure of accounts because they feared that the new account 
scheme would commingle labor and material costs for both 
track and equipment betterments. Next, they went on to point 
out that the new account system, “interrupts the continuity of 
rail statistics at a time when statistical details are most needed 
to point the way to necessary economies and to test the efficien-
cy of operating methods.” This continuity issue would continue 
for some time to come. The roads were also against a month-
ly reporting of depreciation because they felt that such costs 
could not be efficiently apportioned on a regular basis because 
of the irregular pattern of wear and tear. This issue might have 
been mitigated by a compromise to use units-of-usage (prob-
ably based on ton-miles) methodology to determine the depreci-
ation charge. This would have allowed railroads that had oper-
ational disruptions due to weather or seasonal business history 
to deal with equal apportionment problems. Finally, the article 
explained that the new rules would handicap rail operations 
and analysis because they would not be able to keep accounts 
and data not specifically approved by the ICC. This may have 
referred to operational measures (e.g., cost per ton-mile) that 
the railroads did not want the ICC to see because this may have 
lent support to their depreciation theories.
 A Journal report [August 20, 1908, p. 5] articulated a sim-
ilar continuity argument when it said that, “railroads are find-
ing a great deal of trouble in compiling their annual reports 
to conform with all the requirements. … Unless they issue two 
reports, one after the plan followed in the previous years, and 
one under the new accounting system, it will be very difficult 
for the humble stockholder to get an idea of what the compa-
ny has been doing by comparison with last year.” In this same 
article, a comptroller at a “large New York railroad” was quot-
ed as saying, “it is useless to make any comparison of figures 
under the new rules with those in the old way … you are bound 
in the end to get results that are misleading. … We spent a lot 
of money and put in a lot of night work, but when the results 
were ready, they were not worth a picayune.” 
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 The problems related to the continuity of rail statistics were 
also explained to railroad stockholders in annual reports. For 
example, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (Exhibit 2 below) 
in its fiscal year 1908 annual report discussed these accounting 
changes in a tenor that shows its displeasure with the regula-
tions.
EXHIBIT 2
Note on ICC Accounting Change as  
Presented in the 1908 L&N Annual Report
Uniform Accounting System Prescribed by the  
Interstate Commerce Commission:
On July 1, 1907, the new system of Accounts prescribed by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission became effective. Principle changes caused by the orders of 
the Commission were:
1.  Elimination of Expenditures for Additions and Betterments from Operat-
ing Expenses, and,
2.  The inauguration of formal Replacement Accounts for Depreciation and 
Renewals of Equipment.
The changes wrought by the new system should be borne in mind when 
making comparisons of tables in this year’s reports with those in reports of pre-
vious years.
 [Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1908, p.13]
 In a follow-up editorial to “A Defective Accounting System” 
[the Gazette, September 27, 1907, p. 86], the editor pointed out 
that the “errors in the new system are on the whole more hurt-
ful than those in the old, and we believe it to be a matter of the 
greatest regret that at the time a change is made … a change, 
moreover, which works permanent injury to the continuity of 
records.” In an historical irony, when betterment accounting 
was finally discontinued by the ICC in 1983, the FASB had to 
issue a standard (SFAS 73) to deal with continuity of reporting 
problems.
 Another problem raised by this article centered on a per-
ceived uneven application of the rules. For example, the arti-
cle noted that a northeastern railroad that is no longer growing 
would have a smaller amount of depreciation charges due to a 
lower rate of equipment additions. Intuitively this would lead 
to less expense, higher income, and a correspondingly higher 
rate of return on assets. A higher return would, of course, lead 
to a reduction in tariff rates. By comparison, the expanded de-
preciation charges of a railroad in California that continues to 
grow due to migration would have a lower rate of return and, 
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thus, get rate relief from the ICC. Such perceived inconsisten-
cies in rate setting, however, had been a regulatory problem at 
the ICC since its inception in 1887. The infamous “long haul 
vs. short haul” clauses in the original Interstate Commerce Act 
that essentially equalized, under the theory of price discrimi-
nation, all railroad operations in the country regardless of op-
erational efficiencies. The depreciation charges only exacerbat-
ed the problem. 
Theoretical Arguments: The Gazette [October 11, 1907, p. 90] 
published “Equipment Depreciation and Renewal,” written by 
the controller of the Union Pacific, William Mahl. In the arti-
cle, Mahl seemed to imply that there is no depreciation if the 
 railroad is constantly upgrading or replacing its equipment. 
Making a distinction between physical and economic depreci-
ation, he ends the article by pleading to drop the depreciation 
requirements in favor of the old “provision for ‘renewals’ to 
represent the current cost of replacing all equipment vacated.” 
Mahl point out that, “This change will furnish the Commission 
with reliable data about the depreciation which has been car-
ried into the operating expenses of the railroads will enable it 
to order adjustments suitable to each case if any such should 
be necessary.”
 Even with the protests, Adams and the ICC issued more 
accounting regulations in January 1908. These focused on the 
specific information that the ICC required from railroads ev-
ery six months, starting in March 1908. The new regulations, 
however, did not change track and way structure accounting 
nor did they provide guidance on the actual rates a railroad 
should use to depreciate its equipment. The one clarification 
to the 1907 rules noted that the equipment was to be report-
ed on the balance sheet net of depreciation and that the asset 
book value was to be “reduced periodically to the extent of the 
depreciation charge.” Under the original 1907 regulations, the 
railroads assumed that the depreciation was a current operat-
ing expense, but not necessarily a reduction of book value on 
the asset. This new regulation unsettled the railroads because 
of its impact on the return-on-assets ratio and the public’s per-
ception of railroad over-capitalization due to a depreciation of 
equipment that is faster than the payment of bonds.
 The Gazette [January 16, 1908, p. 54] reported on this 
new set of regulations and others to come. In general, the ar-
ticle discussed the process by which the ICC modified its rules 
and some related changes to income statement and balance 
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sheet rules. In an attempt to portray the ICC as an inflexible 
and bureaucratic organization, the Gazette reported that, “An 
erroneous impression has been created that the [ICC] is dis-
posed to reconsider the propriety of depreciation on equipment 
accounts. … In working out the details of such an account the 
commission is willing to consider all practical suggestions and 
is working with members.” The views of Professor Adams were 
unaltered on this subject. 
 To combat the new regulations, Frederick Delano, the pres-
ident of Wabash Railroad, wrote his “Notes on the Application 
of a Depreciation Charge in Railway Accounting,” which was 
published by the Gazette [March 1908, pp. 471-473]. In this ar-
ticle, he criticized the ICC’s depreciation rules on rolling stock 
and then warned that the regulators would soon be issuing new 
accounting rules regarding fixed structures. Delano wanted to 
make his opinion clear to the ICC that depreciation does not 
exist in an economic sense, but is solely related to wear and 
tear and obsolescence. He wrote: “There is admittedly a depre-
ciation or deterioration … but it is difficult drawing the line be-
tween the cost of making good this sort of depreciation and or-
dinary maintenance.” Further to the point, he observed that, “in 
the case of cars depreciation goes on at a rate of 5 percent or 6 
percent per year until the car is 60 per cent depreciated of its 
original value. Beyond that it is assumed there is no deprecia-
tion if maintenance is properly kept up.” This type of deterio-
ration was a concept he called “limited depreciation” because 
the property is eventually replaced through the betterment sys-
tem at which time the costs would be absorbed into current 
expenses. He relates these facts to a perceived public contro-
versy regarding the arcane problems of railroad overcapitaliza-
tion. Essentially, in a long diatribe, Delano felt that the capital-
ization of American railroads was solid, and used this fact as 
evidence of the efficacy of betterment charges. Delano also felt 
that the current system was more flexible than the new depre-
ciation system, allowing better decision making by the board of 
directors regarding the integrity of the property. This can only 
mean that railroad management wanted to retain the right to 
decide when and if betterments and replacement occurred.
 Delano then criticized the ICC requirements for depre-
ciation as fictitious by explaining: “To put expenditures into 
 operating accounts that have not been actually made has been 
regarded as ‘padding’ accounts. To make a charge of depreci-
ation every month on a purely arbitrary basis, when the mon-
ey which is charged is not actually spent in replacement is 
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 obviously charging against operating expenses something for 
which no expenditures has been made.”10
 It is clear from Delano’s objections that the railroad in-
dustry was resisting any rapid change in its accounting meth-
ods from largely cash basis to one that necessitates extensive 
accruals for matching current expenses with income. In addi-
tion, it is also clear from Delano’s comments that industry sus-
pected the ICC’s new rules did have an ulterior safety motive 
after he pointed out that the public and stockholders had the 
right to know the condition of a railroad’s property. Delano 
 ended his article by concurring with “A Defective Accounting 
System” that the change in accounting would be unevenly ap-
plied and mature railroads like Delano’s Wabash would suffer 
the most. To counteract the problem, Delano felt that any de-
preciation charge must be offset by a corresponding adjustment 
in the appreciating value of the property. This would have been 
even more onerous to the industry because the ICC rate setters 
would have probably recognized such appreciation as income 
and lowered tariffs correspondingly.
 Railway Age [May 1, 1908, p. 623] synthesized the argu-
ments of both Mahl and Delano and indicated that the ICC’s 
intentions for the new accounting rules were two-fold. The first 
was to charge depreciation over and above current repairs to 
operating expenses monthly (economic depreciation). Second, 
the ICC’s purpose was to charge this “average life of property” 
to the profit or loss or surplus account, essentially the modern 
matching principle. The article felt that these were neutral is-
sues when taken separately, but that the industry objected to 
them taken in operating expense money that was not spent. A 
monthly charge for accruals would, in the industry’s opinion, 
make the system too rigid and inflexible and deprive the rail-
road of the ability to judge when expenditures should be made. 
The argument from the editorial was simple, “since the charge 
for depreciation is not met with payment of money, it is not an 
expense, and since depreciation continues … even though opera-
tions cease, it certainly is not an operating expense.” The con-
cepts of modern accruals and matching had not yet taken hold 
in the railroad industry. Since it appeared that the ICC was 
not going to relent, the article finally suggested a compromise 
10Delano’s arguments may have come from a 30-year-old court case, United 
States vs. Kansas Pacific Railway Company [99 U.S. 455]. In this case, the court 
disallowed the railroad from using depreciation to determine the amount of net 
earnings available to pay back certain government sponsored bonds.
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where there would be a presentation of two forms of operat-
ing accounts, “operating expenses other than depreciation” and 
“depreciation.”
 H.A. Dunn, a partner at Haskins and Sells, made a similar 
argument in a letter to Railway Age [May 29, 1908, p. 726], but 
he wanted to name the account “expired outlay on productive 
plant” (the basic definition of economic depreciation). Accord-
ing to Previts and Merino [1998, p. 219], the founder of Dunn’s 
firm, Elijah Watts Sells, was critical of the ICC’s new accounting 
rules. He essentially believed that, “depreciation charges should 
be sufficient to ensure asset replacements.” Previts and Merino 
then explained that Sells and Price Waterhouse partner Arthur 
Loews Dickinson argued this based on the assumption that de-
preciation recognition was the only way that one could prevent 
the erosion of capital, an argument closely allied with railroad 
executives. 
 In an April 20, 1908 letter to Adams, Dickinson [1980, pp. 
13-14] wrote: “The object of a depreciation is, we take it, to 
make a provision for the decreases in value from year to year 
by reason of wear and tear, etc., as it accrues instead of as it 
is made good.” Dickinson continued by saying that, “It seems 
to us that to such a proposition there is an obvious corollary 
that renewal expenditures made to arrest Depreciation should 
be charged against a Fund created in the years depreciation 
accrues, and not against the operating expenses of the year in 
which the expenditures are made.” It is clear that Dickinson 
had not moved to the concept of economic depreciation, favor-
ing the 30-year-old accounting methodology articulated by Al-
bert Fink. 
 The opinions of Sells and Dickinson would soon run con-
trary to that of the accounting profession in general. For ex-
ample, Arthur Teele [1908, pp. 89-91], an early supporter of the 
ICC’s new depreciation rules, indicated, “that I do not think it 
is necessary for me to present arguments … as to the necessity 
of promptly taking depreciation of capital … for I believe anyone 
who gives careful thought will agree to the principle of provid-
ing for the loss out of revenues earned in the period the loss is 
occurring.” Teele was on the side of matching and economic de-
preciation. The next year, William Lybrand [1909, pp. 224-227] 
took much the same view of the need for depreciation except 
he stressed the balance sheet rather than the income statement 
because he felt betterment accounting would result in the as-
sets appearing at cost regardless of deteriorated value, wear and 
tear, or replacement. 
20
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 15
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/15
109Heier: U.S. Railroad Depreciation
 Later in that year, Adams used the same themes as Teele 
and Lybrand in a speech to the annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Association of Public Accountants on October 23, 1908. Ad-
ams [1908, p. 381] explained to the audience, “When carried 
to its final analysis, the question of formal depreciation charg-
es to operating expenses is simply a question of what consti-
tutes cost of operation and the time when such cost shall be 
acknowledged.” He further told the gathering that the new sys-
tem assumed “the depletion through the use of that asset in 
operations creates an item of cost of operation that should be 
reflected in the accounts when the fact of this depletion takes 
place.” He further pointed out that, “a statement of net reve-
nue made without including this element of cost in operating 
expenses, is an erroneous statement.” Adams finished this sec-
tion of the speech by saying, “an expense arising through the 
consumption of property employed in operations ought to be 
acknowledged on the accounts with the same scrupulous fidel-
ity as an expense caused by the consumption of labor or ma-
terial.” 
 Adams had obviously solidified his conclusions related to 
the matching principle and the conservative timing on the rec-
ognition of costs. He summed up his feelings on the subject: 
“[It is my] proposition, however, that depreciation is a proper 
charge to operating expenses [and] is one which is regarded as 
an established principle in the science of accounts.” Because 
railroad accountants had helped the ICC create these accounts, 
it appears that he meant these comments for the consumption 
of his opponents, the railroad executives and some of their pub-
lic auditors.
An Internal Industry Debate: In a front-page article, the Journal 
[May 2, 1908, p. 1] weighed into the depreciation argument, 
more or less on the side of the railroads. The article detailed 
the “modifications” that railroad officials wanted the ICC to 
make to the new accounting rules. Many of these changes dealt 
with a reduction in the total number of accounts required by 
the ICC. Most of these accounts dealt with equipment report-
ing detail and the corresponding depreciation for each. The ar-
gument was that 90% of all operating costs were contained in 
these accounts. 
 The report further explained that railroad officials had 
 criticized and chastised the railroad accountants (the AARAO 
committee) for insufficiently studying the effect that deprecia-
tion would have on the bottom line. The railroad officers also 
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complained that net operating revenues were down due to the 
new rules, although they omitted to explain that there was a 
general economic downturn of the American economy at this 
time. In the end, the rail executives seemed to want the account-
ants to help them in two contradictory ways. First, the account-
ants were to report high net income for stock market purposes, 
while at the same time reporting low net income for rate-setting 
purposes, an error already pointed out by Adams in his valua-
tion example. Even after a year, the railroad officials were still 
having problems with ICC definitions of what economic depre-
ciation actually represented, the matching of cost to revenues. 
It became clear that debate over depreciation had moved from 
an industry/ICC conflict to an internal rail industry debate.
 The controller of the Erie Railroad, M.P. Blauvelt, was 
one of those executives who criticized the AARAO in an April 
29, 1908 speech. Blauvelt said that the AARAO’s Committee of 
Twenty-Five “caved in” and “materially altered” its position on 
many aspects of the new accounting system to meet Adams’ 
 demands. The speaker then echoed the rail industry’s party line 
regarding the new accounting rules by stating that, “to depreci-
ate is to lessen the value” of the equipment [Railway Age, May 
15, 1908, p. 81]. C.F. Calvert [1908, p. 230] disputed Blauvelt’s 
accusations by explaining that the “loss in value feared” by the 
railroad executive should actually be viewed in much the same 
way the ICC saw it, as a part of the cost of production.
 After chastising the AARAO, Blauvelt then brought a new 
dimension to the anti-depreciation argument when he suggest-
ed that the ICC might not have the authority to compel rail-
roads to show properly maintained equipment in a state of 
 depreciation. This was an early indication that if rhetoric and 
public opinion would not change the mind of Professor Adams, 
then maybe the courts could. The Commission probably fore-
saw these future arguments from Blauvelt when it wrote in its 
1907 annual report [ICC, 1907b, p. 141] that it interpreted the 
Act, “as imposing upon it the duty of protecting the integrity 
of the net revenue statements published by carriers, and it be-
lieves that formal depreciation charges, conservatively admin-
istered, are essential for attainment of this end.” 
 The Gazette [October, 1908, p. 1,050] presented another com-
promise by urging the ICC to drop depreciation accounting 
and require current replacement cost accounting, which it felt 
would be an improvement over betterment accounting. The ar-
ticle focused on the fact that no two railroads were alike, and 
that any standardized depreciation rates and accounts were not 
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feasible. The article went on to address ten more problems with 
the new system. Most of these dealt with procedures and theo-
retical questions like obsolescence and reserve accounts. How-
ever, the most prominent was the ICC’s assumption that depre-
ciation charges would better protect the stockholder by making 
the charges more standardized and understandable.
 Nearly 15 months before, the Times [August 12, 1907, p. 
10] had supported this position when it focused on the impact 
the new accounting changes had on the stockholder and the 
market. The article went on to say, “the new system would en-
able both the bondholders, and stockholders of the railroad to 
better understand the nature and amount of the company’s in-
come.” By contrast, the issue was raised that the new ICC rules 
favored railroad accountants and not line operations people. 
The argument behind this complaint was unclear, but seemed 
to center on the supposed rigidity of the new rules. As noted 
 previously in the June Gazette article, the railroads were wor-
ried that the new rules would preclude the gathering of addi-
tional and specific “non-financial operating data” used for effi-
cient rail operations. This type of managerial accounting data 
may have included studies of wear and tear on locomotives, 
not the corresponding economic depreciation as intended by 
the ICC.
Problems with the Application of the New Rules: As the report-
ing period for June 30, 1908 came and went, it was clear that 
the railroads were “suffering” under the new rules. The Journal 
[October 13, 1908, p. 1] reported that annual reports of the rail-
roads for the first fiscal year since the adoption of new depre-
ciation rules “. . . may not fully justify the present form of such 
rules, but they go towards affirming the necessity for some more 
uniform and systematic principles for the treatment of equip-
ment maintenance.” The article went on to point out that the 
results of the new accounting rules for fiscal 1908 were marked 
by an “enormous divergence as between one road and another.” 
The Journal felt that these problems revealed “to what extent 
each has in the past been a law unto itself not merely as to 
meeting the individual idiosyncrasies of its own service, but also 
to the ideas concerning the maintenance of the integrity of cap-
ital investment.” These comments seem to correspond with the 
ICC’s hidden maintenance agenda that would force the roads 
to upgrade equipment. In fact, the Journal articles stressed this 
point when it opined that the “popular idea of the new rules has 
been that they required all roads to increase their maintenance 
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charges to cover a more or less imaginary or at best theoreti-
cal depreciation not previously provided for.”
 Though its editorial policy had been decidedly against the 
new rules, the Journal did say it was surprised to find that some 
railroads’ costs actually decreased with the new system as Del-
ano and others had predicted. The real reason for the great di-
versity of operating results was the fact that each railroad had 
a free hand in setting its depreciation rates. The Journal await-
ed future developments: “It remains to be seen whether the 
commission will continue to leave the percentage of deprecia-
tion to the individual determination of the carriers, or attempt 
to fix the percentages for them.” Yet, the Journal’s assessment 
was not totally pessimistic: “Thus far this plan seems to work 
well and pretty directly toward the ends the commission set out 
to accomplish.”
 Were the new rules a failure? From the railroad industry’s 
perspective, the answer was an unequivocal yes! The tone of 
the Journal seemed oddly contradictory when it implied that 
that the ICC’s new rules were failing due to the railroad indus-
try’s intransigence and not because of the concept of deprecia-
tion itself. Regardless of the reasons, it was clear that the ICC 
had a problem on its hands.
 A full year before the Journal’s editorial, a Times article [Oc-
tober 3, 1907. p. 13] reported these potential problems this way: 
“As matters stand, each road has been left to decide for itself 
what percentage it will charge off for depreciation, but all are 
obliged to charge off some percentage. There is no uniformity 
in making these charges for depreciation.” This article pointed 
out that the Rock Island Lines would use a 4% rate for loco-
motives while the Gould Lines were more conservative with a 
corresponding 2% rate. The only guidance on the subject that 
came from the ICC was as an introductory letter from Professor 
Adams in the 1907 The Classification of Operating Expenses. In 
the section entitled “Consideration of Depreciation,” Adams had 
indicated that the depreciation charges should be based on the 
value of the equipment with a percentage applied to the origi-
nal cost. Adams went on to say, “the percentage rate required 
for depreciation of equipment should be limited to the rate re-
quired to replace the price paid” [ICC, 1907a, pp.10-12]. In the 
1908 update [ICC, 1908, p. 22] of the rules, Adams expanded 
and modified his comments to include a depreciation calcula-
tion net of scrap value, and declared that there should be no 
depreciation recognized past the equipment’s estimated useful 
life. Again, the ICC failed to give guidance on useful lives and 
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rates. Adams, in the report, only indicated that the monthly 
charge for depreciation should be computed “using a percent-
age of original or purchase price.”
 Inevitably, the decision that allowed rail companies to se-
lect individual depreciation methods rather than mandating 
a common methodology created a loophole for operating ex-
penses reporting. The Times [October 3, 1907, p. 13] noted that 
the larger rail systems were seeing a decrease in earnings be-
cause of the new depreciation rules. The article then indicat-
ed that the railroad community “in principle approved of the 
requirements of the commission … but in their practical appli-
cation, many have found flaws.” Surprisingly, this article also 
mentioned that some U.S. railroads were already depreciating 
equipment on the books, but this was far from a uniform prac-
tice. The article then closed with a prophecy: “One thing the 
Interstate Commerce Commission will be asked to do is to re-
duce these charges to some uniform basis. Meanwhile some of 
the roads, which have adopted a percentage of depreciation, 
find their net earnings are reduced at a rate, which is very dis-
comforting to the men in charge of finance.” Although this high 
rate of depreciation may have resulted in reduced profits in the 
short run, its probable long-term result may be to increase tar-
iff rates by showing the ICC that return on investment was not 
reasonable since current income is compared to assets whose 
values were reduced by depreciation reserves. The only way to 
stabilize this trend for the railroad was, of course, the contin-
ued replacement of equipment.
 In a companion article, the Times [October 15, 1907, p. 10] 
reported that some roads were concerned that the new depre-
ciation rules might result in a double counting of expenses be-
cause, according to the article, “the commission ruled that in 
addition to the charges for depreciation all charges for renew-
als must be included in operating expenses.” Again, the rail-
roads misunderstood that a charge for depreciation reduced 
book value as the expense was recognized. The article conclud-
ed by forecasting that, “unless the commission does change, 
some railroads will resort to a reduction in the percentages of 
depreciation which they have been charging.” The Times [De-
cember 30, 1907, p. 10] noted that, “It is doubted … whether 
the Commission will be able to decide on any uniform percent-
age of depreciation.” In essence, the railroads were required to 
choose rates that fit their situations, and the Commission had 
put off the temptation of standardizing depreciation rates across 
the board. The article finishing by saying, “it is admitted on all 
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sides that very great care will have to be exercised on the com-
mission in fixing any precise percentage for depreciation charg-
es in order to avoid establishing a standard which would meet 
the case of some roads, but either exceed or fall short of the 
requirements.”
Revised Reporting Rules: The ICC fought back in January 1908 
with the publication of new reporting rules for depreciation, 
which included the aforementioned six-month ICC reporting 
requirements and a new balance sheet classification showing 
equipment at original cost less accumulated depreciation. The 
Journal [February 27, 1908, p. 8] reported on this development 
indicating that the ICC and Henry Adams had “undertaken an 
exhaustive review of the treatment of depreciation charges by 
interstate carriers during the six months ending December 31, 
1907.” The new reporting rules were, in and of themselves, ex-
haustive and included “blanks” for listing all equipment and 
providing separate valuations and depreciation rates, as well 
as the impact per month on income and expenses. The Jour-
nal’s article went on to observe that this was a technical issue, 
and it took familiarity with the railroad accounting to “appreci-
ate fully the labor involved in answering such a series of ques-
tions.” These new rules were not merely clerical in nature be-
cause they also included onerous regulations that required the 
chief railroad accounting officer to certify the accounting and 
depreciation results.11 Finally, the article went on to relate that 
a great many railroad companies had determined their depre-
ciation charges, “making an intelligent guess at the average life 
of locomotives … charging them accordingly.” The writer added 
sympathetically: “It will be no small undertaking to apportion 
these charges as minutely as the Commission’s desires.”
 The problems over depreciation rates would continue for 
many years as indicated in the ICC’s 1913 annual report where 
it was noted [p. 39] that depreciation rates for similar equip-
ment varied from 7% per year to zero. The report said that the 
rates were due to differences in “policy” and were unrelated to 
“physical depreciation.” Although the ICC report provided no 
standard for depreciation rates, it did give an example that in-
dicated a 1% charge rate would be unacceptably low as assets 
11In a similar fashion to the Hepburn Amendment, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, Section 302, Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports, required that 
executives of all publicly held corporations had to sign an affidavit regarding the 
accounting procedures used in the financial statements.
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would be overstated and a fictitious surplus created. The exam-
ple then indicated that a 7% rate was probably too high, lead-
ing to an understatement of income and the creation of “se-
cret reserves.” The “manipulation” of depreciation rates was of 
concern to the ICC; it planned to rein in these problem report-
ers. The Commission made it clear to its readers that it had 
the power to do so under law, but the tactics of the railroads 
themselves were about to change. Since rhetoric and protest had 
failed to dislodge the new accounting rules, it was evident that 
the tide of power had turned against these once politically pow-
erful railway concerns. They were left with only one recourse 
– challenge the new accounting rules directly, first through civ-
il disobedience and then, if necessary, the courts.
LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE DEPRECIATION RULES
 The rail industry, in a brief but combative article in the 
Times [March 2, 1908, p. 10], continued to protest the high 
cost of the application of the new depreciation rules. The ar-
ticle noted that there had been plenty of grumbling from rail-
road officers because the ICC had compelled them to include 
monthly depreciation charges in operating expenses. It was re-
ported that the politically powerful Pennsylvania Railroad had 
gone so far as to refuse to comply with the order. Naturally, the 
ICC wished to fortify its position with complete knowledge of 
past and present accounting practices. 
 The Gazette [January 31, 1908, p. 681] confirmed the 
 Pennsy’s stance on this issue and that of the New York Central 
as well. The publication indicated that the railroads, in making 
monthly earnings reports to the ICC, declined to sign an ICC 
affidavit to that effect. In response, the government proceeded 
against these roads for non-compliance by sending a ten-day 
notice compelling the roads to sign the affidavit. Earlier in the 
debate, the Journal [October 5, 1907, p. 8] had reported that 
there was no uniformity among railroads in their planned ac-
tions against the new accounting rules. At this point, it was re-
ported that companies like the Pennsylvania Railroad had not 
yet made final decisions to defy the accounting and reporting 
orders permanently. The railroads’ indecision over litigation 
may have had as much to do with the unknown future effect 
that depreciation would have in the future financial outcomes 
of the companies as to the authority of the orders themselves 
because some roads were actually benefiting from the change. 
 Regardless of the vacillating opinions of the industry, at 
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this late date, any legal recourse appeared limited due to a Su-
preme Court ruling in January 1909 that supported deprecia-
tion charges for determining rates in the public utility indus-
try.12 In City of Knoxville vs. Knoxville Water Company [212 U.S. 
1], the Court ruled that “a deduction for depreciation from age 
and use must be made from the estimated cost of reproducing 
a waterworks plant when determining the present value of the 
tangible property for the purpose of testing the reasonableness 
of the rates fixed by a municipal ordinance.” This ruling indi-
cated that depreciation was a “determinant of, not an allocation 
of net income,” rendering invalid the utility’s argument that de-
preciation was confiscatory in nature.
 The possibilities for legal action began to improve when 
the Lehigh Valley Railroad announced in the Times [October 
18, 1909, p. 13] that it was refusing to recognize the author-
ity of the Commission. In short, their argument was that the 
ICC had the authority to promulgate accounting requirements, 
but not to force them on the roads. This protest was directed 
against the ICC’s final installment of the uniform accounting 
regulations in August 1909. These regulations, according to the 
report, “restrict(s) the discretion of the directors in the matter 
of charges for depreciation of equipment.”13 
 These issues reported by the Times may have been only 
“shadow problems,” while the real issue centered on the new 
form of a balance sheet formulated by the ICC that showed 
more detail about capital and asset accounts. The formal pro-
test to the ICC from the Lehigh Railroad indicated that the com-
pany believed that the accounting orders “assumed an author-
ity which was not intended to be granted to the commission 
by Section 20 for the act … and further believes the adoption of 
said orders will not before the best interests of the railroad.” 
Essentially the railroad felt that the accounting rules were an 
unwarranted appropriation of the company’s surplus.
 The railroad also contended that those depreciation charg-
es applied to the cost of betterments (repairs) and not the pur-
chase of additional or replacement equipment. It argued that, 
“it is not the desire of the [railroad] to enter at this time into 
12Public utilities included water, gas, and power companies which did not 
come under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
13As a side note, the new rules actually gave the railroads more flexibility 
in determining what amounts should be capitalized by allowing labor to be ex-
pensed under certain conditions. In addition, the ICC relented and combined the 
accounting for betterments and additions. This had the effect of streamlining the 
number of accounts required. 
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any argument with the commission regarding the merit or lack 
of merit of the systems of accounting prescribed in the orders 
mentioned above, as the statistician of the commission, we un-
derstand has been favored in conference with the views of our 
representative.” The ICC had apparently listened to the Lehigh’s 
complaints but had either dismissed or ignored them. The arti-
cle went on to comment that while there were no current plans 
for litigation, the railroad was thinking “about testing the valid-
ity of the orders in law or equity.” It should be noted here that 
the railroad, in its discussion, moved from mentioning Adams’ 
name to the more pejorative “statistician of the commission.” 
The debate was turning personal.
 To add another wrinkle to the rail industry’s anti-deprecia-
tion stance, the article mentioned, “the system promulgated by 
the commission partakes in many respects the practice followed 
by the British railroads, the financial condition of which, and 
their cost of performing service, not withstanding lower wage 
rates paid in that country, being too well known to elaborate 
explanation.” Delano also complained about this perceived Brit-
ish bias and the apparent inefficiencies in its transportation sys-
tem. The “anti-British” focus may have started when Adams, in 
a letter to the railroads in 1908, quoted a British accountant as 
having said: “No profit can exist until the expired outlay of pro-
ductive plant has been provided out of gross revenue” [Chap-
man, 1908, p. 623]. 
 A similar article in the Journal [October 18, 1909, p. 6] a 
week later framed much the same argument by claiming that 
capitalizing betterments (repairs in the eyes of the railroads) is 
an appropriation of income and an increase in asset value on 
the balance sheet that the stockholders would improperly per-
ceive as source of new capital rather than a charge to profit 
and loss. The 1909 rules apparently changed the focus of the 
roads because they were now worried about a public percep-
tion of too little expense rather than the 1907 problem of too 
many new charges. 
 The Journal also thought that it would be unwise for Amer-
ican railroads to adopt excessive capitalization that had worked 
“so disastrously” for English railroads. W.G. Taylor defined the 
term “overcapitalization” as “capitalization (stocks and bonds) 
merely in excess of the cost of production or reproduction of 
the plant” [Johnson, 1908, p. 325].14 It was thought that in the 
14 The British also felt that the Americans were moving to their system. A 
sarcastic article regarding the situation was published in the British account-
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absence of a dollar for dollar match in long-term bonds and 
fixed assets, it would be assumed that the railroads were goug-
ing the public because of the higher rates needed to cover any 
“excess borrowing.” Overcapitalization went against the pub-
lic good. The more colloquial term for this methodology was 
“stock watering,” which had given the railroads a bad reputa-
tion in the past. This issue would continue contentious for the 
next 20 years and would be the crux of future rate arguments. 
It constituted the central reason why the ICC was going to at-
tempt systematically to standardize the “value” of all railroads 
in the U.S.
 Before any of the railroads could file against the ICC, a 
parallel set of lawsuits began working their way through the 
courts. The Goodrich Transportation Company and the White 
Star Lines attempted to have the 1910 issuance of Special Re-
port Circular 10, which required them to report certain ac-
counting data to the ICC, overturned in court. In ICC vs. Go-
odrich Transportation Lines and White Star Line [224 U.S. 194], 
the two companies argued that they did not come under ICC 
jurisdiction because the law creating the ICC implied that only 
shipping lines affiliated with railroads could be regulated. As 
independent Great Lakes steamship lines, they were therefore 
exempt. The Times [April 2, 1912, p. 15] reported that that the 
court disagreed and indicated that they were required to follow 
ICC regulations because they were a business in the pursuit of 
interstate commerce by definition of the law. 
 Because the courts allowed the ICC to require formal re-
porting by the water-borne carriers, the railroads’ protests over 
accounting and reporting issues appeared to be dead, except for 
one challenge from the Kansas City Southern Railroad filed in 
November 1911. The Journal [November 17, 1911, p. 1] report-
ed that the railroad sued in Commerce Court over the refusal 
of the Commission to allow the capitalization of certain outlays. 
The argument was narrow and dealt with a $10 million charge 
that the ICC wanted taken into income because the railroad did 
not “charge against earnings the estimated replacement value 
of six parcels of abandoned roads incident to grade reduction.” 
Simply put, it had not offset the cost of new railroad grades 
ing journal Accountant on July 20, 1907. It noted: “The ‘reform’ is curiously in-
teresting inasmuch as it affords a rather pathetic spectacle of the United States 
striving to get back to the low level of British railroad statistics and Great Brit-
ain struggling to attain the fullness of perfection exhibited by the now discarded 
American method” [ Journal of Accountancy, 1907, p. 318].
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they had completed with the value of the abandoned right-of-
ways for depreciation purposes. The railroad felt that this pro-
cess not only hurt income but also impaired the market val-
ue of bonds issued to pay for the betterments. There appeared 
to be a contradiction in the ICC regulations because it allowed 
capitalization on the grade changes to the existing right-of-way 
but not for the change in location of the same rail system that 
would have substantially reduced operating costs. 
 The Supreme Court issued its ruling in Kansas City South-
ern vs. U.S. [231 U.S. 423], upholding the ICC’s rules [the Jour-
nal, December 6, 1913, p. 1]: “The Supreme Court sustained a 
ruling of the ICC, and established absolute authority of that 
body to decide questions of accounting practice.” Adams, how-
ever, could not savor this 1913 victory as he had retired two 
years earlier from the ICC after nearly 25 years of service. Al-
though the seven-year debate over accounting policy had started 
out cordially enough, by the time of his retirement it was begin-
ning to get ugly with civil disobedience, litigation, and recrim-
inations. A Times editorial [September 24, 1910] eyed the sus-
picious nature of the ICC as it pertained to the dual issues of 
accounting treatments and railroad valuation. The article took 
the stance that no two railroads could ever be valued the same, 
“Yet, it is the [holy] grail of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion.”
 The critical tone of the editorial seemed to point to the ill-
advised concept that all railroads were equal and that such regu-
lations would harm the industry. Adams was portrayed sarcasti-
cally: “In obedience to the theories of Prof. Adams [the ICC] has 
adopted a system of accounting designed to impede the meth-
ods of betterments from earnings which has made the capital-
ization of American railroads a world’s marvel.” This was prob-
ably another veiled reference to the opinion that English roads 
were overcapitalized. Whether the ICC indeed viewed the Eng-
lish system of accounting to be superior is not known, but it 
probably saw most other industries embracing economic de-
preciation and became unrelenting on the issue, wavering lit-
tle from its basic theory. Such regulations, as the railroads and 
the press felt, penalized the efficient and well-run railroad. 
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS
 By the end of 1913, the ICC had essentially won on the 
 issues of uniform accounting measures and its authority to 
 impose reporting requirements on the railroads. The ICC’s 
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 annual report [1913, p. 39] noted: “The Commission continues 
to receive … the cooperation and assistance of different classes 
of carriers in formulating accounting systems which will fur-
nish the Commission with the largest possible measure or in-
formation while recognizing the practical limitations.” Within 
the next year, the ICC would issue a wide range of accounting 
regulations for all the constituent industries and companies un-
der its jurisdiction. Round one of the great American deprecia-
tion debate was over.
 The ICC and the related concepts of “economic deprecia-
tion” and “cost matching” were clear winners, but the necessi-
ty of maintaining efficient rail operations in a large, prosper-
ous, and growing country would take precedence over theory 
for the near future. In an apparent vindication and a mild re-
buke to the theories of Henry C. Adams, the ICC granted the 
railroads a five percent rate increase on December 18, 1914. Al-
though reported as a victory for the railroads, it was indicat-
ed in the Times [December 19, 1914, p. 1] that gross revenues 
compared to expenses had dropped drastically since 1910 due to 
the “inelastic nature of many expenses.” According to the Com-
mission, the “recent increased provisions for depreciation … that 
may militate against a fair comparison of … comparable statis-
tical items … we cannot say this on the record that such charg-
es as the present returned by the carriers are excessive, viewed 
with from the standpoint of proper accounting.”
 The ICC commissioners, even with the accounting data be-
fore them, could not decide upon the reasonableness of rates of 
return as envisioned by Adams, but neither did they scrap the 
new system in favor of the old pre-1907 betterment accounting 
rules. In this case, it appeared that regardless of what the rates 
of return were telling the ICC about them, the railroads were 
not generating enough income and corresponding cash flow to 
cover operations and complete the necessary asset replacements 
mandated by the ICC. In fact, the ICC realized that the roads 
were in a dire situation because they would be unable to float 
bonds in Europe to finance replacements due to the war that 
had erupted in August 1914. In the end, even with Professor 
Adams’ rate theories and uniform accounting data, the decision 
had come down to one of expediency and necessity to maintain 
the integrity of the American rail system for the traveling and 
shipping public. In the meantime, the accounting policy of the 
railroads would remain at odds with those of American indus-
try in general for some time to come. 
 The depreciation debate was again renewed in 1923 when 
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the ICC ordered the depreciation of track right-of-way and way 
structures. This order set off another ten years of protests and 
litigation that would culminate in the ICC’s canceling the or-
ders in 1933 due to the economic depression. The final phase 
of the debate over betterment accounting would recommence in 
the mid-1950s with an attempt by Arthur Andersen to reinvig-
orate an economically moribund rail system through the con-
vergence of railroad accounting practices with industry GAAP. 
This time Arthur Andersen challenged the theoretical under-
pinnings of railroad accounting rules in light of depreciation 
standards issued by the Committee on Accounting Procedures 
during World War II. The debate created a strange coalition as 
Arthur Andersen stood against the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants which sided with the railroads and the 
ICC. The final demise of betterment accounting for rail struc-
tures would occur in February 1983 when the ICC, bowing to 
pressure from the Internal Revenue Service and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, abolished its usage. Congress abol-
ished the ICC itself in December 1995.
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